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Book Review: Cyber War Will Not Take Place
In 2005, the U.S. Air Force boasted it would now fly, fight, and win in cyberspace, the ‘fifth
domain’ of warfare. This book takes stock to consider whether or not cyber war is a real threat.
Thomas Rid argues that the focus on war and winning distracts from the real challenge of
cyberspace: non-violent confrontation that may rival or even replace violence in surprising
ways. Tracing the most significant hacks and attacks, and exploring case studies from the
world of computer espionage and weaponised code, this is an undoubtedly impressive work,
writes Julia Muravska.
Cyber War Will Not Take Place. Thomas Rid. Hurst. April 2013.
Find this book: 
That warf are and crime are “indistinguishable in the shadowy online
world” was the central claim of  a recent Financial Times report on
cybersecurity, and it is a ref lection of  the issue’s rise to the “dominant
f eature of  the global polit ical agenda” that several major media outlets
and policymaking outf its have dispensed with the space between “cyber”
and “security”, all the better to convey its unprecedented nature.
Thomas Rid, the author of  Cyber War Will Not Take Place, would have
wholeheartedly agreed with this assessment, arguing, as he does in the
book, that “all known polit ical cyber of f enses are neither common crime
nor common war” (p. 10).  However, Rid would have been highly crit ical of
the implicit message that we are witnessing the advent of  the “much-
vaunted war in the ostensible f if th domain” of  cyberspace. And he has
written Cyber War Will Not Take Place to explain exactly why (p. 164).
Rid sets out his chief  claim right at the beginning, namely that “cyber war
has never happened in the past, it does not occur in the present, and it
is highly unlikely that it will disturb our f uture” (p. xiv). What we are rather seeing, he contends,
are polit ical cyber attacks that are “sophisticated versions of  three activit ies…as old as human
conf lict itself : sabotage, espionage, and subversion” (p. xiv). All three types of  activity use the opportunit ies
and are subject to the limitations of  digit ised computer networks. But none can be credibly classif ied as war.
And to be truly successf ul, as Rid insists throughout the book, all three continue to rely on the proverbial
“human f actor” – that crit ical knowledge or cooperation of  somebody “on the inside”, the key tip-of f  f rom
an inf ormant, the indispensable context that only human intelligence can provide.
In a divergence f rom the book’s t it le, Rid’s core message may best be both paraphrased and summarised
as “there is no such thing as cyber war”. Rather, there is cyber warfare, one amongst many methods and
instruments of  waging war whose nature has remained unchanged throughout human history. Rid builds
this argument gradually, in an empirically detailed, conceptually sophisticated, and technically precise, but
yet concise and not overly complex manner – no small f eat when discussing a phenomenon of  which most
of  us have at best an inadequate understanding. In the process, he brings much-needed clarity and
perspective to the current cyber security debate and is to be commended f or doing so in an area where
secrecy, anonymity, and deniability are the norm.
Rid’s f oundation is the revered f ounding f ather of  modern theory of  war, the Prussian general and brilliant
strategic thinker Carl von Clausewitz, who def ined war as “an act of  f orce to compel the enemy to do our
will” (p. 1). As such, war is inherently violent, always instrumental, and thoroughly polit ical. Physical violence
“is the pivotal point of  all war” (p.2). Cyber attacks, however, could ever only be “indirectly violent”, and most
“cannot [even] sensibly be understood as a f orm of  violent action” (p. 12). This is because, f irst, the “act of
f orce” at the heart of  conventional war, f rom a drone strike to a suicide bomber attack means “pushing a
button or pulling a trigger will immediately and directly result in casualties” (p. 3). This is f undamentally
dif f erent f rom an act of  cyber war. Taking out a major urban electricity grid through pre- installed logic
bombs, f or instance, would mean that the link between “somebody pushing a button and somebody else
being hurt” is complex, indirect, and contingent on numerous circumstances (p. 3).
Second, as Rid argues, cyber weapons, which he def ines as “computer code that is used, or designed to be
used, with the aim of  threatening or causing physical, f unctional or mental harm to structures, systems or
living beings,” do  not “come with their own explosive charge” (p. 13). They can only do such damage by
“parasit ically…unleashing the violent potential” of  the target, be it a power plant manipulated to explode or
a traf f ic control system f orced to f ail (p. 13). Finally, Rid really wants us to appreciate that “publicly known
cyber weapons have f ar less f irepower than is commonly assumed” (p. 41). Thus, attacking industrial
control systems, “the most probable way f or a computer… to create physical damage and indirectly injure
or kill people” is extremely dif f icult in practice due to the complex structure and continuously improving
def ences of  such networks (p. 67). Similarly, Grade-A “online sleuthing,” a highly customised, resource-
hungry, intelligence- intensive af f air, is also dif f icult to pull of f , doable f or “only very f ew sophisticated
[state] actors” (p. 169).
Rid’s work is undoubtedly impressive, relying on a wealth of  diverse sources to provide litt le-known,
tantalising details of  known “cyber security incidents” such as the inf amous Stuxnet, annoying ILOVEYOU,
impressive Flame, and obscure Duqu, to name but a f ew. Yet, throughout the book, the reader cannot
shake of f  a sense of  conf usion as to what Rid is actually attacking. In building his case f or “why cyber war
will not take place,” he never sets out how such a war might actually look. As a result, one may be convinced
that it will not happen, but is not entirely sure of  what the myth of  cyber war is and why it is in need of
thorough debunking. A similar crit ique may be levelled against his violence argument – a conceptualisation
of  physical violence in war would have been helpf ul; as it is, Rid has not really discredited the argument that
war need not be inherently violent and violence need not be f undamentally directed against the human body
as he alleges, a point that seems to be borne out by recent developments such as the emergence of
nonlethal weapons, prolif eration of  robotics and increased ef f orts to avoid collateral damage in war.
In addition, Rid’s otherwise robust case f or pervasive exaggeration plaguing analyses of  cyber attacks’
impact is somewhat undermined by his drawing conclusions f rom an incomplete empirical record – f or
instance, just because some attacks cannot be unequivocally attributed to Russia or China, does not mean
that these states were not in f act behind them, as Rid seems to suggest. Similarly, just because the level of
damage wrought by a particular piece of  malware or breach is not known, does not mean it was not
alarmingly signif icant. Finally, Rid’s argument would have been considerably bolstered by a greater f ocus on
f uture trends – af ter all, war continuously evolves and reinvents itself . More specif ically, by Rid’s own
admission, the implications of  an intelligent, learning coded weapon able to evaluate the environment,
analyse courses of  action, and “then take action” –in f act, it would be surprising if  such an agent has not
yet been developed— would be f undamental f or the nature of  cyber security and Rid’s argument. It would
have been very interesting to learn what Rid thinks these implications may be.
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